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NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
AND POST-ACQUISITION TARGET REORGANIZATION

Abstract
We examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about
the nature of the shareholders’ and employees’ interests when it comes to reorganization,
under the assumption that the firm is coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate
governance institutions prevalent in the countries of origin of the merging firms enable or
constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target. Using a cross-national dataset of
corporate acquisitions and post-acquisition reorganization, we found support for our
predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country
compared to the target country increases the acquirer’s ability to restructure the target’s assets
and leverage the target’s resources, while the protection of employee rights in the target
country restricts the acquirer’s ability to restructure the target’s assets and transfer resources
to and from the target.

Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, post-merger restructuring, national governance
systems, governance institutions, institutional environment, stakeholders.

2

INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are one of the most important ways in which companies
seek to create value by gaining access to new capabilities or markets. They have also been
touted as a way for firms to adjust to changes in their competitive environment. Scholars in
the fields of economics and strategic management see acquisitions as a prime mechanism for
firm survival and growth (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Bowman and Singh, 1993; Jensen,
1993; Mitchell, 1994; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Karim and Mitchell, 2000). Identifying a
target and actually taking it over, however, are only the beginning of a process of
reorganization that can take months, even years (Barney, 1988; Capron, 1999; Haspeslagh
and Jemison, 1991; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Karim, 2006; Datta, 1991).
The post-acquisition process is all about reorganization, and this process is rarely smooth
because in acquiring a new bundle of assets and capabilities, the company also inherits the
way in which the target is embedded in its institutional environment, including relationships
with stakeholders like shareholders and employees (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Haveman
and Cohen, 1994; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). The management literature has long
recognized that firms are coalitional in nature, that is, an arena in which various groups vie
for influence over key decisions (Bendix, 2001; March, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Therefore, the dynamics among the various corporate stakeholders, and the possible conflicts
of interest among them, shape the acquirer’s ability to engage in reorganization.
In this paper, we adopt an institutional perspective to argue that the ability of acquirers to
reorganize their acquisition targets depends on the characteristics of the national corporate
governance systems of the merging firms. Specifically, we explore the effect of the degree of
protection of shareholder and employee rights on post-acquisition target reorganization,
focusing our theoretical and empirical analysis on the regulative pillar of institutions (Scott,
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2001:50-54). Target reorganization encompasses asset restructuring and resource transfers,
both of which have the potential to pit the rights of shareholders against those of employees.
Asset restructuring refers to actions such as the disposal of some of the acquired assets
(which may entail layoffs), the recombination of those kept by the acquirer under a different
organizational or managerial structure and the elimination of redundant activities and
inefficient management practices, most likely in the target firm (Karim, 2006; Brickley and
Van Drunen, 1990). Resource transfers refer to an actual shift of technological, marketing or
operational knowledge from the acquirer to the target or vice versa, which may affect
employees in various ways (Capron, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004).
Post-acquisition reorganization provides institutional theory with an ideal setting in which
to explore issues of power and influence. As Campbell (2004:1) noted, institutions “reflect
the resources and power of those who made them and, in turn, affect the distribution of
resources and power.” While research on hostile takeovers adopts this perspective (Hirsch
1986; Schneper and Guillén 2004), our paper is the first to pursue an institutional analysis of
the potentially divergent interests of shareholders and employees during the post-acquisition
process. In emphasizing the causal role of the power and influence that stakeholders enjoy,
given a set of regulatory corporate governance institutions, we build on the research agenda
formulated by the coalitional view of the firm (March, 1962). Thus, we frame our analysis of
post-acquisition reorganization in terms of the theory of macroregulatory institutions and
their effects on behavior, decision making, and change (Campbell, 2004; Scott, 2001).
By focusing attention on regulatory institutions at the national level, we address an
important gap in the strategy literature. As Crossland and Hambrick (2007: 770) recently
stated, “in the several works that have examined how environmental factors constrain
executives, environment has always been equated with industry. There has been no
consideration of the role of higher-order, macro-environmental forces on managerial
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constraint (or its observed latitude of action).” While reorganization is a process that takes
place at the micro level, it does not occur in an institutional vacuum. We argue that regulatory
corporate governance institutions affect the reorganization process by giving the various
stakeholders in the firm different degrees of power and influence over corporate decisions, as
business historians have noted (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000, 2003). Strategy scholars have not
theorized exactly how corporate governance systems may affect post-acquisition dynamics,
and evidence on the extent to which national institutions influence the firm’s ability to change
and adapt is scarce. In particular, we know little about how firms conduct their acquisition
strategy across different national governance regimes, and we know even less about crossborder post-acquisition reorganization, where shareholders and workers are subject to very
different national corporate governance institutions.
After controlling for the fact that acquirers may self-select into acquisitions from which
they believe value can be extracted, in part due to the corporate governance system within
which the target operates, we argue that acquirers embedded in a system that protects
shareholder rights better than in the context in which the target resides, are likely to exert
more pressure to reorganize the target during the post-acquisition period. We develop an
institutional account of this process drawing on the conceptualization of shareholder interests
in agency theory (Jensen, 1993). Going beyond agency insights, we also propose that target
employees whose labor rights are well protected are likely to constrain the acquirer’s ability
to restructure the target’s assets or to transfer resources across the merging firms. However,
we note that acquirers have heterogeneous capabilities when it comes to dealing with
different institutional regimes. We thus expect an acquirer’s past acquisition experience to
moderate the effect of target employee rights on the acquirer’s ability to reorganize the target,
as theories of experiential learning would predict (Levitt and March, 1988; Argote, Beckman,
and Epple, 1990).
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The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we review the literature on the role
of national corporate governance institutions in firm restructuring. In the second section, we
develop our hypotheses. We then present our data and methods in the third section. We lastly
present and discuss our results.

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance has to do with the allocation of rights and obligations among the firm’s
stakeholders, including shareholders, managers, workers, and others with a stake in the
corporation. The rights and obligations of the various stakeholders are defined and enforced
to varying degrees depending on the institutions of corporate governance present in a given
country. Those institutions include formal laws and regulations, codes of good governance,
taken-for-granted assumptions about the appropriate role of the various stakeholders, and
other informal norms of behavior sanctioned by tradition or practice (Aguilera and Jackson,
2003; Guillén, 2000, 2001; Roe, 2004).
We view “regulative” institutions, including those associated with corporate governance,
not just as constraints but also as elements that support and empower actors (Scott, 2001: 5054; Schneper and Guillén, 2004). In other words, institutions contribute to constituting actors
as such and to preserving their roles, rights, and obligations over time. For instance, under
German corporate and labor laws, half of the seats on boards of directors of companies above
a certain size are reserved for workers and their representatives. This kind of institutional
support for worker rights is likely to have an impact on post-acquisition target reorganization.
We take existing national corporate governance institutions as given, and examine their
impact on post-acquisition target reorganization. As a result of history, power struggles,
compromises and happenstance, corporate governance institutions differ vastly across
countries, with important implications for the degree of influence enjoyed by shareholders
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and workers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003;
Schneper and Guillén, 2004). National corporate governance traditions are distinctive, deeply
rooted, and relatively resistant to change. An important element that explains persistent crosscountry corporate governance differences has to do with the underlying ideology as to how
the corporation should be governed: as an economic entity whose purpose is to maximize
shareholder value, or as a social institution whose purpose is to further the interests of the
corporation itself, typically considering the interests of multiple stakeholders (Aguilera and
Jackson, 2003; O’Sullivan, 2003; Schneper and Guillén, 2004). Countries fall at some point
along a continuum defined by two major types: liberal-market economies and coordinatedmarket economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Liberal-market economies – such as the UK, the
US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland – are distinguished by competitive market
arrangements, with supply and demand forces having a significant impact on organizational
outcomes and processes. In liberal-market economies, shareholder rights are highly protected
and labor relations are characterized by open-market relationships, with firms having the
freedom to hire and fire employees almost at will (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004).
Coordinated-market economies – such as Germany, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian
countries – are characterized by a high degree of organization and coordination of interest
groups. In these stakeholder-centered countries, employees, suppliers, customers, and
financial institutions can exert legitimate claims on firms that go beyond pure arm’s length
transactions.
An important issue in corporate stakeholder research is the definition of which specific
actors should be included in the analysis. Although Freeman (1984: 46) suggested that any
“group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of the organization’s
objectives” can be called a stakeholder, recent theorists have tended to narrow their attention
to the most important sets of actors for a given context (Windsor, 1992; Mitchell, Agle, and
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Wood, 1997). Carroll (1989) defined stakeholders as those actors who have either a legal or a
moral claim over the actions of the firm. Blair (1995) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003)
argued that only stakeholders with a significant firm-specific investment should enjoy
influence in discussions about corporate control. Other scholars stressed the role of
“secondary” stakeholder groups as groups that affect or are affected by firm behavior
(Freeman, 1984) yet do not have a formal contractual or legal bond with the firm, as is the
case with employees, customers, and government regulators (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).
Although some scholars have studied the relevance of stakeholders like managers,
suppliers, customers, political parties, and the surrounding community (Delmas and Toffel,
2008; for a review, see Donaldson and Preston, 1995), we focus our analysis on shareholders
and employees because of their relatively direct claim on the allocation of the company’s
cash flows and rewards and because they are the most frequently mentioned actors for their
potential impact on cross-national differences in corporate governance (e.g., Franks and
Mayer, 1997; Aoi, 1997; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000; Driver and Thompson, 2002; Aguilera
and Jackson, 2003; Jackson, Höpner, and Kurdelbusch, 2004).

INSTITUTIONS, AGENCY, AND POST-ACQUISITION TARGET
REORGANIZATION
A useful way to begin a theoretical analysis of the impact of national corporate governance
institutions on post-acquisition reorganization is to examine the basic premises of the
shareholder-oriented model. The market-for-corporate-control hypothesis contends that the
interests of shareholder-principals are best protected by unrestricted competition for the
stewardship of corporate assets using a takeover market (Manne, 1965). Beyond the
disciplinary merit of disposing of “managerial deadwood” (Samuelson, 1970), economists
and strategy scholars credit acquisitions with stimulating industry restructuring (Dutz, 1989;
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Anand and Singh, 1997), achieving efficiency gains (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987),
recombining resources (Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan, 2001), and exploring new
capability domains (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). These potential gains, however, are
contingent on the institutional incentives and constraints facing the acquirer’s managers,
which may provide them with more or fewer opportunities to restructure assets or transfer
resources following the acquisition. Following the extant literature, we argue that the
acquirer’s shareholders are bent on maximizing the positive impact the acquisition will have
on their wealth, in terms of the cash flows that accrue to them, while minimizing the negative
consequences. Indeed, acquirer shareholders generally prefer to see management move
swiftly to reorganize the target (Jensen, 1993).
Much of the corporate governance literature on the acquisition process highlights
shareholder rights and neglects the role of other stakeholders, treating employment relations,
in particular, as exogenously determined by labor markets (e.g., Blair and Roe, 1999; Buono
and Bowditch, 1989). This omission reflects the theoretical focus of agency scholars on
interests of the owners, i.e., the shareholders (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994), as well as the
weak employee participation in corporate governance in the United States compared to
countries such as Germany or Sweden (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Schneper and Guillén,
2004). During the post-acquisition process, the target company’s employees are crucial to
achieving the benefits of the acquisition, but often have interests opposed to those of the
acquirer’s shareholders (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004). The disruptive effects of acquisitions
on the target’s employees are well documented (Walsh, 1988; Haveman and Cohen, 1994;
Conyon et al., 2002); acquisitions often lead to a breach of trust with target firm employees
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
Applying the same logic of economic self-interest to employees would lead one to assume
that they are also predominantly interested in maximizing cash flows, in the form of the
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wages they receive. Raise in target employee wages can be obtained through higher postacquisition target efficiency. Yet, higher wages may have less appeal if they are accompanied
by the fear of job losses, which may happen as a result of target reorganization like
downsizing and change in work practices. Furthermore, much cross-national research
indicates that workers are also interested in working conditions, intrinsic rewards such as job
satisfaction, and employment stability (Bendix, 2001), which may also affect cash flows to
shareholders. Most importantly, workers are not as mobile as shareholders, finding it much
more difficult to switch from one firm to another. Let us analyze each stakeholder in turn.

Acquirer’s Shareholders and Target Reorganization
Under the assumption that shareholders are interested in maximizing their wealth, they will
expect management to take action after the acquisition to ensure that the target delivers
appropriate cash flows. The literature points out that in countries where shareholders are in a
better position to assert their rights, managers (i.e., their agents) feel more pressure to make
decisions consistent with shareholders’ interests (Fligstein, 1990; La Porta et al., 1998).
Drawing on an international sample, Atanassov and Kim (2008) found that shareholders’
ability to force value-enhancing measures on poorly performing firms varies with the degree
of shareholder protection. Large-scale layoffs and top management turnover are more likely
when investor protection is strong. In a study of eight emerging economies, Gibson (2003)
showed that firms in countries with a legal system of Anglo-Saxon origin are more likely to
experience management turnover after poor performance because the common law system in
these countries tends to provide stronger shareholder protection.
In order to serve the interests of shareholders, it is customary for managers to take actions
to reorganize the target firm in order to increase the cash flows generated by the acquired
assets. The M&A literature has outlined two main types of actions acquiring firms take to
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deliver returns to their shareholders: restructuring the target’s assets to save costs and
transferring resources across the merging firms to enhance capabilities (Barney, 1988;
Capron, 1999; Karim, 2006; Brickley and Van Drunen, 1990). Asset restructuring is the focus
of much economics and strategy research, which sees acquisitions as an opportunity to take
corrective action or to achieve cost savings, thanks to the size of the newly-formed company.
Where acquisitions are made in order to turn around underperforming targets, acquirers are
likely to impose substantial corporate governance changes on the target firm, by restructuring
its board, management, labor force, and internal organizational processes in order to serve the
shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1993). Several empirical M&A studies also stress the role of
cost synergies (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Research has
documented post-acquisition downsizing of the target’s managerial team (Walsh, 1988;
Franks and Mayer, 1996) and workforce (Capron, 1999; Conyon et al., 2002).
Studies of mergers and acquisitions also highlight the resource-based view of the firm and
examine resource sharing (or redeployment) among merging firms (Barney, 1988). An
acquirer can transfer its expertise to help the target become more cost-efficient and also to
help it grow (Penrose, 1959; Capron, 1999). The acquirer can also access complementary
resources by acquiring targets with unique resources, for example, in human-intensive
acquisitions (Coff, 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2002). Sharing technological resources
(engineering skills, research, proprietary technology, patents, know-how) may enhance the
merging firms’ innovation capability, which can be converted into a price premium and/or
increased volume, leading to higher revenues (Karim and Mitchell, 2000). Acquirers can also
benefit from sharing commercial resources through greater geographical coverage and
product line extension.
However, existing national governance institutions influence the extent to which the
acquirer’s shareholders can harvest the benefits of acquisitions. Managers under pressure
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from powerful shareholders will move quickly to replace the target’s management,
restructure its assets and transfer resources, with a view to attaining better performance as
speedily as possible. In contrast, managers who operate under less shareholder pressure might
be more inclined to postpone unpopular post-acquisition measures in order to keep the peace
inside the organization. They might maintain the target in a preservation mode in order to
maintain consensus at the expense of achieving economic benefits (Haspeslagh and Jemison,
1991).
Comparative legal scholarship (Reynolds and Flores, 1989; Glendon, Gordon, and
Osakwe, 1994) and more recent economic analyses (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999) show that shareholders’ interests receive different degrees of
legal protection across countries. If national legislation protects shareholder rights, one would
expect managers to move swiftly in the wake of an acquisition to extract as much value from
the target as possible through asset restructuring and resource transfers. Acquirer
shareholders might also take action to remove managers at the target (Jensen, 1993). If the
rights of the target’s shareholders, prior to the acquisition, were well protected, they would
have probably put pressure on the target’s management to maximize their wealth well before
the acquisition happened. In contrast, if the rights of the target’s shareholders, prior to the
acquisition, were not particularly well protected, there are more likely to be opportunities for
restructuring the target and reaping economic benefits within it after the acquisition happens.
Therefore, asset restructuring and resource transfers are more likely when the new owners
enjoy significantly better protection of their ownership rights than the previous owners did.1
In the context of cross-border acquisitions, one such situation occurs when the new owners
1

Note that we do not assume that managers of acquiring firms from shareholder-friendly countries make
post-acquisition decisions that are always consistent with the interests of their shareholders. The organizational
literature has indeed stressed that even in countries that are shareholder-friendly, acquisition strategies can be
beset by agency problems (Palmer and Barber, 2001). Yet, comparatively speaking, agency problems with
acquisition strategies will tend to be less pronounced when the acquirer firm is located in an ostensibly
shareholder-friendly country.

12

are from a country that gives better protection of shareholder rights than the target’s country.
Accordingly, we predict:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The stronger the legal protection of shareholder rights in the
acquirer country when compared to the target country, the more the target firm will
experience asset restructuring (H1a) and resource transfers (H1b).

Target’s Employees and Target Reorganization
While much prior research examines the extent to which shareholder rights are protected by
corporate governance institutions, we also consider the status of employees. In the wake of an
acquisition, the target’s employees can become important stakeholders whose preferences
and actions affect the ability of the new management team to engage in asset restructuring
and resource transfers. The relative power of employees also differs across countries because
of cultural, political and legal factors (Blair and Roe, 1999): the greater the influence of labor,
the lower the priority of value-enhancement objectives. Faleye, Mehrotra and Morck (2006)
find that US publicly traded firms whose employees have a greater voice in corporate
governance (i.e., own at least 5% of firm equity) deviate more from value maximization,
spend less on new capital, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and
exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. Labor is primarily concerned with
maintaining current and future cash flows at a level sufficient to prevent wage or benefit cuts
(Jensen and Meckling, 1979), thus explaining a low risk, low investment, and low growth
strategy.
Although post-acquisition reorganization measures should be beneficial to shareholders,
some or all of the gains may be made at the expense of other stakeholders. Shleifer and
Summers (1988) view the change of control of a company as an opportunity to renege on
implicit aspects of the employment contract and to renegotiate employment, effort, and pay
levels on terms less favorable to the target’s employees. Benefits from target asset
reorganization may indeed be obtained at the expense of target employees’ interests.
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Empirical studies have found that the target firm is likely to bear the brunt of restructuring
measures and layoffs (Capron, 1999), which often trigger resistance from target employees.
Asset restructuring at the target also entails internal reorganization of the workforce,
including the elimination of jobs which typically creates gaps in the division of labor that
must be filled by reorganizing the remaining jobs, producing a cascade of lateral and vertical
internal movement in response to the elimination of organizational positions (DiPrete, 1993).
Similarly, benefits from resource transfers still hinge on the acquirer’s ability to redesign
work practices, transfer people across sites or functions, or recombine teams (Stovel, Savage,
and Bearman, 1996; Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 2001). Both vulnerable employees
and employees with vested interests are likely to oppose these resource transfers if they have
to learn new skills or if they lose power to the benefit of new individuals and groups within
the organization (Levitt and March, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Oliver, 1997).
In countries like Germany, where national corporate governance institutions strictly
protect the labor force, adjustments in labor force are harder to implement, thus raising the
costs of post-merger reorganization (Debroux, 1996; Cappelli, 2000). In other countries and
regions – Japan, South Korea, South Asia, Southern Europe, Latin America – workers have a
level of protection that stronger than the typical liberal-market economies of the US and the
UK but less strong than the coordinated economies of Central and Northern Europe.
Stricter employment protection laws are associated with lower turnover in the labor
market and with extended periods of work and unemployment (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004).
As a result, the more a country’s corporate governance institutions protect workers’ rights,
the lower the employer autonomy and the lower the geographical and professional mobility
of its labor force (Sparrow, Schuler, and Jackson, 1994). For instance, evidence suggests that
Janapanese companies are more willing than American firms to incur costs (in the form of
lost profits) to protect their workforce from the effects of economic downturns. Thus,
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workers who claim “property rights” to their jobs (Althauser and Kalleberg, 1981) may have
enough power to mitigate the firm’s response to external pressures and force it to shield them
from the effects of industrial restructuring (DiPrete, 1993).
Employees in a highly protective national labor regime are likely to prefer voice rather
than exit in response to grievances because there may be penalties attached to leaving the
firm without penalty (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Rigid labor markets make hiring a worker
somewhat of an irreversible decision and reduce the mobility of the labor force (Gugler and
Yurtoglu, 2004). In addition, when employee skills are firm-specific, the employee’s greater
dependence on the firm makes the option of leaving less appealing (Williamson, Watcher,
and Harris, 1975). Employment protection makes labor turnover more difficult and adds to
insiders’ bargaining power. Strict hiring and firing regulations tend to increase the power of
unions at the firm level.
When post-acquisition reorganization affects the interests of the target’s employees, we
expect them to resist the post-merger changes to the extent that national corporate governance
institutions enable them to do so. Therefore, we propose:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The stronger the legal protection of the target’s employee rights
in the target country, the less the target firm will experience asset restructuring (H2a)
and resource transfers (H2b).

Acquirer’s M&A Experience as a Moderator
Firms and their managers differ in their ability to operate effectively in a given national
corporate governance system and to handle negotiations that address stakeholders’ concerns.
The organizational literature recognizes that capabilities are learned over time as the firm
accumulates experience (Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein,
1999). Prior research stresses that experiential learning accumulates as a result of the
reinforcement of prior choices (Levitt and March, 1988; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Zollo and
Singh, 2004). Each firm has a stock of collective knowledge that informs the pattern of
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decisions its managers make. Organizational learning, accumulated by making an acquisition
and reorganizing the target, influences this collective knowledge. Experience with
acquisitions provides opportunities for managers to learn from their successes and failures,
while shaping the development of routines that help them deal with similar situations and
contingencies in the future (Cyert and March 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Haleblian and
Finkelstein, 1999). In turn, the success or failure of prior experiences reinforces the firm’s
routines (Levitt and March, 1988). With increased acquisition experience, firms are likely to
develop an embedded knowledge of how to conduct post-acquisition changes, and
specifically how to deal with target employees (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Zollo and Winter,
2002).
Controlling for the likely effect of experience on the acquirer’s choice of target firm and
country, we argue that acquisition experience offers the acquirer insights into the best
approaches to negotiate with stakeholders in order to address their concerns. Hillman and
Keim (2001) argue that managing relationships with primary stakeholders such as employees
can constitute intangible, socially complex resources that may enhance firms’ ability to
outperform competitors. Because of the relational aspects that underlie these activities, time
and experience are likely to be important. With acquisition experience, acquirers may become
more capable of anticipating the reaction of internal stakeholders and negotiating with them
very early in the acquisition process. Frequent acquirers may also be better at designing
incentive schemes and communicating the benefits of job rotation, new work practices, and
work flexibility. Acquisition experience may help acquirers reduce the trauma of target
reorganization and help survivors overcome their resistance and recommit to being motivated
and productive (Brockner, 1988; Cartwright and Cooper, 2000). Overall, frequent acquirers
also may become better at aligning the pace of integration with the type of post-integration
measures they need to take. They may also be more adept at weighing the costs of
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downsizing the workforce or reshuffling resources against the benefits expected from those
post-acquisition actions. Hence, we propose:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): An acquirer’s acquisition experience mitigates the negative
effects of legal protection of the target firm’s employee rights in the target country on
target asset restructuring (H3a) and resource transfers (H3b).

DATA AND METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
Our dataset includes information on post-acquisition asset restructuring and resource transfer
processes at the firm level (Capron, 1999) and on corporate governance institutions at the
national level (Schneper and Guillén, 2004). The data span 253 acquisitions undertaken by
190 acquirers located in 14 countries and targets in 27 countries. The unit of analysis is the
corporate acquisition.
To study the micro-processes of post-acquisition asset restructuring and resource transfer,
we gathered the data through a survey of North American and European companies. The
initial sample frame consisted of 2,020 horizontal acquisitions undertaken between 1988 and
1992 by manufacturing companies. Only acquisitions within the same four-digit US SIC
industry were considered. The acquisitions included cases where the acquirers purchased
entire corporations and cases in which acquirers purchased distinct business units from
continuing corporations. We chose the period 1988-1992 in order to exclude both recent
acquisitions in which post-acquisition decisions had not yet led to asset restructuring or
resource transfers at the time of the survey, and older acquisitions for which managerial
turnover made it difficult to gather detailed information about post-acquisition activities
retrospectively. Information sources include the International Merger Yearbook (Securities
Data Company, 1990, 1991, 1992), Mergers and Acquisitions Sourcebook (Juker, 1990,
1991, 1992), Mergers and Acquisitions International (Investment Dealers Digest, 1990,
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1991, 1992), and Fusions et Acquisitions (Magazine Fusions et Acquisitions, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1992).
We mailed the survey questionnaire2 during 1994 and 1995 to the acquiring companies
included in the sample frame described above, and addressed to the chief executives of the
business units that undertook the acquisition. In the cover letter, we asked for the survey to be
completed either by the CEO or by a senior executive with overall responsibility for the
acquisition. After the initial mailing, and following Dillman (1978), we mailed two follow-up
letters and one replacement questionnaire.
From the initial sample, we mailed questionnaires to 1,778 acquirers for whom we
obtained addresses. We received a total of 273 completed questionnaires, representing a
response rate of 16%. This response rate is reasonable, given the location of the potential
respondents in more than a dozen countries in two continents, firm diversity, information
sensitivity, and organizational positions (CEO, president, executive chair, vice president of
finance, vice president of corporate development and managing director). The dataset has a
broad distribution of acquirer and target firms. Almost half of the acquisitions took place in
the chemical, food, and pharmaceutical industries. Acquirers tended to be larger than targets,
including 60% listed as public companies. Most acquirer firms focused on one main business
or were diversified in related businesses before the acquisition. Cross-border acquisitions
represented 70% of the cases. More than 90% of the acquirers reside in France, the UK, the
US, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Belgium. More than 90% of the targets reside in
France, the UK, the US, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark,
Switzerland, and Canada.
2

Measurement scales were developed after reviewing the relevant literature and then pretested with a small
group of academics and consultants. Preliminary versions of the questionnaire were pretested with senior
executives from large US and European firms in charge of acquisition programs. Results from this phase led to
the revision of several items to improve their clarity and the addition of a number of new items. On-site, face-toface interviews with CEOs or executives in charge of acquisition programs at 10 large firms from our sample
produced further suggestions that were incorporated into the final version of the questionnaire.
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We recognize that self-reported measures can carry some methodological limitations (for a
discussion, see Dillman, 1978; Rossi, Wright, and Anderson, 1983). To limit potential biases
associated with the survey method, we generated a rich corpus of measurement scales based
on a review of the literature and on the on-site interviews with executives in charge of
acquisitions in our sample. The survey contained multiple items measuring each construct,
which were distributed throughout each section to avoid consistency bias. We also introduced
several control questions at various points. To address possible response-style biases (e.g.,
“yea-saying”), we introduced items that were heterogeneous in content and worded some
items positively and others negatively or scale-reversed (Baumgartner and Steenkamp, 2001).
We deleted the few cases that exhibited a lack of convergence across similar questions.
Finally, we did not use survey data to measure our two key independent variables:
difference in shareholder rights between the acquirer and the target countries, and target
country labor rights. Instead, we used indexes that have been extensively used in the
institutional and economics literatures. By using different sources of information to build our
dependent and independent variables, we reduced the potential impact of common-method
bias, which always poses a threat to survey-based research (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Dependent Variables and Methods
We assessed the effects of national corporate governance institutions on three types of
dependent variable: (1) the extent of post-acquisition target restructuring, (2) the extent of
post-acquisition transfers of acquirer resources to target and (3) the extent of post-acquisition
transfers of target resources to acquirer. We measured the degree of post-acquisition target
asset restructuring using an adapted version of the instrument developed by Datta (1991). We
measured the extent to which the operations of the target firms were restructured along three
main functions: R&D, manufacturing, and sales networks. We assessed the degree of
restructuring for each function by taking the mean value from a set of three questions
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pertaining to (1) the degree of capacity disposed of (closed or resold), (2) the degree of
capacity restructured, and (3) the degree of personnel layoffs, measured on a seven-point
continuous scale (1 = 0% restructured, 7 = 91-100% restructured). We assessed the reliability
of each of the three target restructuring variables using Cronbach’s α on the three-item scale
(disposal, restructuring, layoffs). Cronbach’s α ranged between 0.80 and 0.90, providing
strong evidence for the reliability of our “target asset restructuring” measures.
We used three types of resource-transfer variables to measure the extent to which the
acquirer redeployed its own resources to the target firm. We drew on resource typologies to
focus on three dimensions of resources: technology, marketing, and management (Morck and
Yeung, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). First, we measured the transfer of acquirer
technical resources to the target by taking the average of two five-point scale items that
measured the extent to which the acquirer transferred its own researchers and engineers to the
target. Second, we measured the transfer of acquirer commercial resources to the target by
using two five-point scale items that assessed the transfer of commercial and administrative
staff from acquirer to target. Finally, we measured the transfer of acquirer managerial
resources to the target by a five-point scale item that assessed the transfer of acquirer senior
executives to the target firm. The obtained Cronbach’s α value varied between 0.74 and 0.77.
We used the same type of variables to measure the extent to which the target transferred its
resources to the acquirer.3 The obtained Cronbach’s α value varied between 0.82 and 0.90.
Our dependent variables were continuous in nature and the data were cross-sectional.
Therefore, we used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as the estimation method.
Independent Variables

3

Transfer of personnel or resources from target to acquirer (or from acquirer to target) does not necessarily
imply that those employees/resources will move to the relevant home countries of the acquirer (or target). For
instance, an acquirer buying a foreign target may have overlapping sites, branches, and offices with the target in
its home market or in other geographical areas (such as in retail banking, cement, or the automobile industries).
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We measured changes in shareholder rights after the merger by calculating the difference
between acquirer country shareholder rights and target country shareholder rights. A positive
value means that the target was acquired by a firm from a country that was more protective of
shareholder rights. We used the time-varying country shareholder rights index developed by
Schneper and Guillén (2004).4 For Hungary, a country not included in their database, we used
the indexes developed by Pistor (2000), who calculated shareholder rights indexes for the
former socialist countries during our period of study.
We measured target country labor rights by using the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) time-varying Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
strictness index. For each country, employment protection legislation is described along 18
basic items, which can be classified under three main areas: i) employment protection of
regular workers against individual dismissal; ii) specific requirements for collective
dismissals; and iii) regulation of temporary forms of employment. Starting from these 18
basic pieces of information, a four-step procedure was developed for constructing cardinal
summary indicators of EPL strictness that allow meaningful comparisons to be made, both
across countries and between different years. We present a summary of the procedure to
calculate the OECD EPL index in Table A of Appendix 1 (a full description of the items can
be found in OECD Employment Outlook, 2004: 102-106).
The EPL strictness index varies from zero to 6, with zero for countries with very low
employment protection and 6 for countries with very strict employment protection legislation.
4

They built on La Porta et al.’s (1998) cross-sectional index for 1996 and constructed a time-varying measure
for each country during the period 1988-1998 by referring to a number of legal sources. Thus, their indicator
covers the period to which our data refer, namely, 1988 through 1992. La Porta et al.’s (1998) cross-sectional
index ranged from zero to 6 and was calculated by adding one point for the presence of a provision protecting
six representative rights in the country’s commercial code or company law, namely: (1) allowing shareholders to
mail their proxy vote at a shareholders’ general meeting; (2) not requiring shareholders to deposit their shares
before attending the shareholders’ general meeting; (3) the presence of a legal mechanism enabling minority
shareholders to challenge the decisions of management or assembly; (4) the ability to vote cumulatively on
appointments to the board of directors (or to be guaranteed proportional representation); (5) preemptive rights
for new share issues for all current shareholders; and (6) a minimum percentage of shareholder capital of 10% or
less in order to call a special shareholders’ meeting.
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There are large cross-country variations of the EPL index: it tends to be relatively low in the
US (0.21), the UK (0.60), Canada (0.78) and Switzerland (1.10), while it is relatively high in
the Netherlands (3.08), Germany (3.17), Spain and Portugal, both (4.10). It is interesting to
note that Scandinavian countries, i.e., Norway and Sweden in our study, tend to score high
both on investor protection (4 and 4) and labor protection (2.25 and 3.49 respectively).
Denmark, Finland and France represent intermediary countries with an investor protection
score of 3 and an EPL strictness index that varies between 2.30 and 2.93. A sharp contrast
exists between Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK, Canada and the US with high investor
protection (5 or 6) and low labor protection (below a value of 1) and Continental or Southern
European countries like Germany, Belgium, and Greece with very low investor protection
(between 0 and 2) and very restrictive labor legislation (above 3). Table 1 provides the
acquirer country shareholder rights index and target country labor rights scores we used in
our study.
*** insert Table 1 here ****
We measured the extent to which the acquirer’s experience could moderate the effects of
target country labor rights on post-acquisition target asset restructuring and resource transfers
by including in our model an interaction term calculated by multiplying acquirer M&A
experience by target country labor rights. Acquisition experience is a self-reported measure
of the number of acquisitions made by the acquirer within the five years preceding the
acquisition of the specific target. To reduce the level of correlation between the interaction
term and target country labor rights, we mean-centered the variables measuring target country
labor rights and acquirer M&A experience.
Control Variables
We controlled for several other factors that could influence the level of post-acquisition target
reorganization. Given our focus on country-level independent variables, we controlled for the
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labor rights of the acquirer country. For instance, acquirers from countries with very
restrictive labor legislation may use cross-border acquisitions to implement restructuring that
would be very costly or not worth undertaking in their home country, or to acquire resources
that they could not develop from their home base because of the difficulty of reshuffling
resources to new uses in a flexible manner.
We controlled for interaction effects between the labor rights in the target country and the
differences in the shareholder rights of the previous owner’s country and those in the country
of the new owner (i.e., the acquirer). In their study of restructuring decisions of poorly
performing firms, Atanassov and Kim (2008) find suggestive evidence of an interaction
effect between labor rights and shareholder rights; in particular, they find that management
turnover is lower when collective relations laws are stronger, with the relation being
significant only for firms located in countries with poor investor protection. We therefore
added the interaction of the target country labor rights and the acquirer’s relative shareholder
rights among the control variables. If an acquirer is from a country giving stronger
shareholder rights protection than the previous owner of the target, the acquirer will be under
more pressure to engage in asset restructuring and resource transfers, regardless of the
target’s labor rights situation.
We controlled for whether the acquisition was domestic or cross-border (using a dummy
variable that took the value of 1 for cross-border acquisitions). Cross-border mergers may
increase the difficulty of exerting stakeholder rights due to a more complex post-acquisition
process. At the same time, cross-border mergers may entail greater target reorganization due
to institutional arbitrage opportunities. We also controlled for the extent to which the
acquisition took place in a growing or a declining industry. We used a five-point scale
measure for “domestic industry growth”, ranging from “rapidly growing” to “rapidly
declining”, and then reversed the scale. We used a five-point scale measure for “international
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industry growth”, ranging from “rapidly growing” to “rapidly declining”, and then reversed
the scale.
We controlled for acquirer motive by a comprehensive set of measures (1-5 scale): 1)
accessing new markets, 2) accessing new geographical markets, 3) achieving manufacturing
economies of scale, 4) acquiring complementary resources from the target, 5) transferring
resources to the target, 6) reducing overcapacity, 7) reducing financial risk, 8) turning around
the target, and 9) preventing a rival from buying the target firm. We controlled for the target
and acquirer firms’ pre-acquisition profitability. We measured pre-acquisition profitability
relative to the industry average by using a five-point scale that ranged from “much more
profitable” to “much less profitable”. We then reversed the scale of the two variables. We
also controlled for the relative annual sales of target to acquirer, using a five-point scale (with
1 indicating a relative size of the target to the acquirer of less than 25% and 5 greater than
100%) and whether the target was public (i.e., stock-listed).5
We also controlled for the possibility that shareholder and labor rights not only influence
post-acquisition target reorganization but also the occurrence of a merger or acquisition in the
first place. In order to correct for this selection issue, we calculated the predicted number of
M&As for a sample of 46 target countries with complete data on both sides of the equation.
The dependent variable was the number of M&As reported in the SDC-Platinum database.
We ran a negative binomial regression using shareholder rights, labor rights, GDP per capita,
GDP growth, stock market capitalization, and the labor force (to account for size) as the
independent variables. We report the estimates of this country selection model in Table 2. We
found that M&A activity in a country is positively associated with the strength of shareholder

5

Although the target shareholders’ incentives can also depend on the transaction financing (cash versus stock),
we do not include this variable as a control in our study because of the specificities of our sample. In the
subsample of 80 acquisitions for which we obtained the information, 76% of the acquisitions were fully paid in
cash and in 90% of the acquisitions, cash was used as the dominant mode of payment. Also note that most of the
acquisitions were made in cash during the study period.

24

rights and negatively correlated with the strength of labor rights. GDP per capita and GDP
growth positively influence the level of M&A activity in a country. We included the
predicted number of M&As in each target country as an additional control in all of the
regressions on post-acquisition reorganization.6
*** insert Table 2 here ***

RESULTS
The descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables are presented in Table 3.
Most of the bivariate correlations are small. The correlation between target labor rights and
the difference in shareholder rights between the acquirer and target countries, however, is
positive and large. The potential multicollinearity problem, however, did not manifest itself
in the form of unstable parameter estimates or large standard errors. The correlations between
the predicted number of M&As and the two aforementioned variables were large and
negative. Excluding the predicted number of M&As from the regression, however, would
have prevented us from controlling for the possibility that acquirers select target countries
based on the degree of protection of shareholder or labor rights.
**** insert Table 3 here****
Table 4 presents the regression results. Models 1 through 3 show the effects of investor
and labor rights protection on post-acquisition target firm restructuring concerning R&D,
manufacturing, and sales networks, respectively. Models 4 through 6 show the results for the
post-acquisition transfers of the acquirer’s technology, marketing, and managerial resources
to the target. Finally, Models 7 through 9 present the results for post-acquisition transfers of
the target’s technology, marketing and managerial resources to the acquirer.

6

It should be noted that we cannot control for the additional selection issue of acquirers’ preference for target
companies that offer restructuring opportunities above those that do not. Unfortunately, the SDC-Platinum
database does not include information on those aspects.
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**** insert Table 4 here***
We found support for H1a on the effect of shareholder rights differences on target asset
restructuring. Controlling for industry growth, acquisition motive, and pre-acquisition
profitability, among other variables, we found that as the new owner comes from a country
with better-protected shareholder rights, the target experiences more restructuring in its R&D,
manufacturing, and sales network. In contrast, we found partial support for H1b on the effect
of shareholder rights on the transfer of resources. We obtained robust support for the role of
shareholder rights on the transfer of target resources to acquirer. We did not find a significant
relationship between shareholder rights differences and resource transfer to the target
(although this relationship becomes marginally significant in the AMOS model – see below).
Altogether, these results suggest that stronger pressure from investors not only generates
more restructuring at the target but also higher leverage of the target’s resources. These
results also provide a more nuanced assessment of the role of shareholders, who are
commonly viewed as focusing on cost cutting rather than on innovation and capability
enhancement. Our results suggest that shareholder pressure can have an effect on both types
of post-acquisition action.
Our results lend systematic support for H2a and H2b on the impact of labor rights
protection. When the rights of the target’s employees in the target country are better
protected, the target will witness less restructuring of either R&D or manufacturing (H2a),
and fewer resource transfers of technology, marketing, or management to and from the target
(H2b). It is important to note that the strength of labor rights in the target country has an
effect not only on the extent of post-acquisition asset restructuring but also on resource
transfers. These findings are in line with previous studies of labor rights, which found that the
strength of labor rights not only affects restructuring but also new investments and growth.
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We found support for H3a on the moderating effect of M&A experience. The results
suggest that the M&A experience of the acquirer may mitigate the negative effects of target
country labor rights on post-acquisition target restructuring. We also found partial support for
H2b: the acquirer’s M&A experience helps mitigate the negative effects of target country
labor rights on post-acquisition resource transfers to the target, although our analysis
indicates a non-significant effect on resource transfers to the acquirer. These results suggest
that experience helps the acquirer to find ways of minimizing workforce resistance.
Capturing new resources from the target might be more complex, more idiosyncratic and less
subject to the experience effect.
Interestingly, we found a positive and significant main effect of experience on the extent
to which the acquirer restructures the target’s manufacturing assets (Model 2) and sales
networks (Model 3), as well as on the extent to which it transfers its commercial (Model 5)
and managerial (Model 6) resources to the target. Among other control variables, we also
found that the labor rights in the acquirer country were positively associated with the resource
transfers from target to acquirer (Models 7, 8 and 9). This result is consistent with the
literature on cross-border labor solidarity at multinational firms, which suggests that if labor
has power in the home country, the acquirer is more likely to enhance the value of the target
by transferring resources than by downsizing (Guillén 2001: 123-156). We also note some
interaction effects between labor rights in the target country and the differences in
shareholder rights of the previous owner and those of the new owner (notably for Models 1
and 8). In addition, we found a positive and significant relationship between acquirer motive
for turning around the target and the extent of post-acquisition restructuring. In contrast,
acquirer motive for entering a new geographical market is negatively associated with postacquisition restructuring. Industry growth is positively associated with post-acquisition
resource transfers. Profitable acquirers are more likely to restructure unprofitable targets and
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transfer resources to assist the development of profitable targets. Finally, the predicted
number of M&As in the target country was also found to be significant in Models 1, 3, 5 and
6.
We conducted supplementary analyses to ensure the robustness of our results and found
qualitatively unchanged results. First, we performed regressions using another index of labor
protection developed by Kucera (2002) at the International Labour Organization (ILO). This
is a measure that captures the violations of the right to free association and collective
bargaining (FACB). In the context of our study, we rescaled the values of the FACB rights
violations to obtain our measure of labor rights. The rescaled index varies from 0 to 10. For
instance, Germany has a score of 0.53 with Kucera’s FACB rights violation score; its labor
rights score becomes 9.47. The United States has a score of 5.26 with Kucera’s FACB rights
violation score; its labor rights score became 4.74. The correlation between the OECD EPL
index and the rescaled ILO FACB is 0.85. The results remained qualitatively unchanged.
We also performed regressions on the subsample of cross-border acquisitions (N = 177,
71% of the total sample). We found a similar pattern of results, with the interaction term
between target labor rights and acquirer experience becoming even more significant in a few
models (Models 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8).
To further control for self-selection into specific countries due to differences in
shareholder and labor rights protection, we also ran a model including a control for the level
of foreign direct investment inflow into the target country during our study period. This
variable was significantly correlated with the level of M&A activity in the country (r = 0.42,
p< 0.001). The inclusion of this additional variable did not change the rest of our results.
Finally, we added dummy variables accounting for the year of the acquisition and obtained
similar results.
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We also estimated a model including a dummy variable capturing whether the acquiring
firm had made only one acquisition in our sample (i.e., it returned only one survey about one
specific target) or had made more than one acquisition (i.e., it returned several surveys about
several different targets). We did not find any qualitative differences in our results. We also
added some dummies to control for the length of time that elapsed between the acquisitions
and the informants’ depiction of them. The time elapsed varied from three to five years. We
found no significant effect.
The standardized coefficients reported in Table 4 for asset restructuring (Models 1, 2 and
3) for the three key variables of interest indicate that, when both shareholder and labor rights
are significant, the negative effect of labor rights is greater in magnitude than the positive
effect of the differences in shareholder rights. These two effects are of similar magnitude for
resource transfers to target (see Table 4, Models 4, 5 and 6). The magnitude of the
standardized interaction effect between labor rights and acquirer experience is so large that a
standard deviation increase in acquisition experience – i.e., gaining experience with 6.62
more acquisitions – offsets the negative effect of a standard deviation increase in labor rights
for Model 2, and nearly offsets this effect for Model 6.
In addition to the OLS estimations reported in Table 4 (Models 1-9), we also ran three
specifications (Models 10-12 of Table 5) employing structural equation modeling (SEM). We
used this approach because the data on the dependent variables come from a survey with
multiple items representing different facets of post-acquisition target reorganization. In
Model 10, the dependent variable, “Target restructuring” (η1), is a construct consisting of the
three “target restructuring” items that were used in Models 1 (R&D), 2 (manufacturing) and 3
(sales networks), with respective loadings of 0.72, 0.84 and 1 (α = 0.65). In Model 11, the
dependent variable, “Resource transfer to target” (η2), is a construct consisting of the three
“resource transfer to target” items that were used in Models 4 (technology), 5 (marketing)
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and 6 (management), with respective loadings of 0.67, 0.91 and 1 (α = 0.76). In Model 12,
the dependent variable, “Resource transfer to acquirer” (η3), is a construct consisting of the
three “resource transfer to acquirer” items that were used in Models 7 (technology), 8
(marketing) and 9 (management), with respective loadings of 0.42, 1 and 0.72 (α = 0.65).
Given the multi-faceted nature of our constructs, we obtained good loadings for each
construct except η3. In order to explore this problem further, we re-ran the analysis in Model
12 without the item whose loading was 0.42, and our results did not change.
**** Insert Table 5 about here***
Our results fully support H1 and H2 and tend to be stronger (at two-tailed tests) than the
results we obtained throughout Models 1-9 using OLS. We obtained some variation for H3.
In the SEM analyses, the interaction of acquisition experience with labor rights had a
significant effect only on “Resource transfer to target” (η2), whereas in OLS regressions it
also had a significant effect on target restructuring (Models 1-3). We also ran a baseline
model (i.e., without the hypothesized independent variables), and the R2 dropped from 44% to
35% in Model 10, from 41% to 16% in Model 11, and from 48% to 38% in Model 12, all of
which are highly significant.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although post-acquisition reorganization is quintessentially a micro process of change, we
have found evidence for our argument that the extent of target asset restructuring and
resource transfers depends on the nature of regulatory macro institutions, an insight that had
not been previously pursued by strategy scholars. We examined the characteristics of national
systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the shareholders’ and
employees’ interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is
coalitional in nature. Using a cross-national dataset of corporate acquisitions and postacquisition reorganization, we found support for our predictions that stronger legal protection
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of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target country increases the
acquirer’s ability to restructure the target’s assets and leverage the target’s resources, while
the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer’s ability to
restructure the target’s assets and transfer resources to and from the target.
In finding a robust effect of macro regulatory institutions on micro-level decisions and
outcomes, we have further developed and advanced a key insight of institutional theory,
namely that economic action is embedded in dynamics of interest, power and influence. Postacquisition reorganization lends itself to theorizing this important aspect of institutional
analysis because of its intrinsic potential for conflict. We have also found that experienced
acquirers partially mitigate the negative effects of target labor rights on target asset
restructuring and resource transfers. This finding is consistent with theories of experiential
learning, highlighting that a situation in which experience is beneficial in that it enables the
firm to navigate better an institutional environment. It is also congruent with the resourcebased view of the firm and its assumption of firm heterogeneity because firms with
experience have a capability that enables them to overcome institutional obstacles.
Institutional theory can benefit from the insights of experiential learning theory and the
resource-based view because institutions are internalized by economic actors in different
ways, especially in the case of macro institutions like corporate governance rules and
regulations.
While strategy scholars have made important contributions using institutional theory to
study competitive strategy in general, and M&As in particular, previous research has not
applied a similar approach to post-acquisition dynamics. Our theoretical and empirical
analysis presents yet another way in which institutional theory can be brought to bear on
important strategy issues. The finding that micro-level decisions and processes are affected
by macro institutions has implications for both strategy research and practice. The concept of
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the competitive environment needs to be expanded to include not only industry aspects but
also national institutions. Firms operate in a nested environment, which in turn can be shaped
by their political strategies (Bonardi, Hillman, Keim, 2005; Capron and Chatain, 2008).
Undertaking research without acknowledging this important fact runs the risk of specification
error, and making actual business decisions ignoring the implications of national institutions
could lead firms seriously astray.
It is important to note that our theoretical explanation for the negative effect of target
employees’ resistance to post-acquisition reorganization is qualitatively different from that
offered by previous research in strategy. Scholars have tended to attribute employees’
negative emotions and attitudes to cultural misfit, loss of organizational identity, fear of job
losses, or the acquirer’s lack of fairness (Ranft and Lord, 2002; Larsson and Finkelstein,
1999). Past research has not examined “the conditions under which target employees could
actually exert their power in the acquisition process and successfully oppose shareholders’
interests”. Our findings suggest that the political balance between acquirer shareholders and
target employees depends, to a certain extent, on the institutional characteristics of both
acquirer and target countries.
Our empirical results have some managerial implications. They suggest that managers
need to take the role of national governance institutions into account when making
acquisitions. Acquiring firms should strive to assess the impact of those legal variables on the
expected cash flows and to factor them into the target price. On the one hand, national
governance institutions can prevent the acquirer from making necessary post-acquisition
changes, and so the target price should be discounted to account for that risk. On the other
hand, acquirers may create value in cross-border acquisitions due to institutional arbitrage
opportunities, and so the target price should be adjusted upwards to account for those
opportunities. Acquirers from a shareholder-friendly country who buy a target from a less
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shareholder-protective environment have opportunities for value creation by enforcing valuecreating changes at the target. In the same vein, an acquirer that is highly constrained by a
restrictive labor regulation can acquire firms in countries with less restrictive labor regulation
in order to implement strategies based on asset restructuring or resource recombination that
would not be easily implemented in its home country. Also merging firms can create a new
combined governance system in order to leverage the best of their respective institutional
environment. This is illustrated by Lenovo’s acquisition of the IBM Personal Computer
Business and the borrowing of many elements from the American governance system to
manage the newly merged entity.
Our theoretical and empirical analyses have several limitations. First, our study is
restricted to post-merger target asset restructuring and resource transfer decisions in
horizontal M&As. In this specific and potentially tense context, employment protection may
diminish acquirers’ ability to cope with the need for substantial and rapid labor force
adjustments. Our arguments do not imply that labor protection systematically hinders
shareholders’ interests and economic returns. Several studies have shown that stable
employment relationships may promote workers’ efforts, cooperation, and investment in
firm-specific human capital, which may enhance productivity and create value, notably in
industries with a cumulative knowledge base (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002).
Second, we used survey data to capture micro-level processes of post-acquisition target
reorganization. As with any survey-based data, concerns about accuracy of retrospective data
and desirability bias may arise (Sudman and Bradburn, 1973; Golden, 1992). Third, we
examined post-acquisition processes that took place during the 1990s. To ensure the
relevance of our results, we examined how the institutional variables used in our model have
evolved in the last decade. The EPL strictness index has remained relatively unchanged over
the past decade, with a correlation of 0.91 between the 1990 index and the 2003 index. The
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same observation holds for shareholder rights, for which we observe a correlation of 0.95
between the index of the early 1990s and the index of the early 2000s. The persistent nature
of cross-country institutional differences indicates that acquirers making acquisitions today
are very likely to face similar constraints to those faced by acquirers in the 1990s.
Fourth, we focused our analysis on the institutional attributes of the merging firms’
countries. Research has also found other country-level factors such as political, cultural,
ideological, historical, and technological variables or intellectual property protection regimes
to affect firm-level strategy and performance outcomes (Oxley, 1999; Henisz, 2000; Kogut,
Walker, and Anand, 2002; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Davis, 2005; Fiss and Zajac, 2004).
Finally, we focused on country-level variation in governance systems to capture a
phenomenon that is likely to be a combination of country (Hall and Soskice, 2001), region
(Saxenian, 1994), industry (Herrigel, 1996), and firm-level characteristics (Westphal and
Zajac, 1998; Wulf, 2004; Capron and Shen, 2007).
These limitations offer avenues for future research on the relationship between corporate
governance institutions and M&As. Our paper represents just a first step in our understanding
of the complexity of the relationship between firm-level governance systems, micro-level
processes of value creation, and country-level institutional regimes.
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Table 1
Coding of Shareholder and Labor Rights
Acquirer Country
Shareholder Rights
Schneper & Guillén index (2004)
Based on La Porta et al . (1998)
0-6 Index (0= lowest; 6= highest)
Austria
2
Belgium
0
Canada
5
Denmark
3
Finland
3
France
3
Germany
1
Italy
1
Netherlands
2
Norway
4
Sweden
4
Switzerland
1
United Kingdom
5
United States
6

Target Country

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
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Shareholder Rights
Schneper & Guillén index (2004)
Based on La Porta et al. (1998)
0-6 Index (0= lowest; 6= highest)
4
2
0
5
5
3
4
3
3
3
1
2
2.5
3
1
3
2
4
3
3
4
4
1
2
5
6
1

Labor Rights
EPL Strictness Index
OECD (2004)
0-6 index (0=lowest; 6=highest)
0.94
2.21
3.15
na
0.78
na
1.90
2.30
2.33
2.98
3.17
3.60
1.27
0.93
3.57
3.13
3.08
2.25
1.49
4.10
3.88
3.49
1.10
3.76
0.60
0.21
na

Table 2
Negative Binomial Regressions Predicting the Number of M&As by Country
Number of M&As in target country
Variable
Target country shareholder rights
0.18*
(0.13)
Target country labor rights
-0.24***
(0.09)
Target country GDP per capita
0.01***
(0.01)
Target country GDP growth
0.09***
(0.04)
Target country stock market capitalization
-0.01
(0.01)
Target country labor force size
0.01
(0.01)
Constant
0.47
0.63
Log Likelihood (Chi², 5 df; p value)
-212.39 (74.96, p < .001)
n
45
*Standard errors of regression coefficients are in parentheses.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .10; one-tailed tests.

41

Table 3
Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 253)
Variables
1. Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights
2. Target country labor rights1
3. Target country labor rights x acquirer M&A experience1
4. Acquirer M&A Experience1
5. Acquirer country labor rights
6. Target country labor rights x difference in acquirer target shareholder rights
7. Cross-border acquisition
8. Domestic industry growth
9. International domestic growth
10. Acquisition motive: Access to new products
11. Acquisition motive: New market entry
12. Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies
13. Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources
14. Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources
15. Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity
16. Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk
17. Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm
18. Acquisition motive: Block a rival
19. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger target profitability
20. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger acquirer profitability
21. Relative annual sales of target to acquirer
22. Public acquirer
23. Predicted # of M&As in target country
24. Acquirer country shareholder rights2
25. Target country shareholder rights2
1
2

Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0.03
2.09
-6.00
5.00
0.00
2.35
-7.40
2.60
0.54
0.64 14.64
-106.77
76.46
0.11 -0.01
0.00
6.62
-4.92
45.08
0.09 0.04 0.08
2.01
1.15
0.20
3.60
-0.44 0.18 -0.11 -0.08
0.12
0.22
-0.25
0.25
-0.22 -0.26 -0.20 -0.05 0.91
0.71
0.46
0.00
1.00
-0.01 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.16 -0.23
2.42
0.96
1.00
5.00
-0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13
2.18
0.92
1.00
5.00
-0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 0.62
3.40
1.45
1.00
5.00
-0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.09 -0.12 0.12 -0.25 -0.05 0.03
3.65
1.54
1.00
5.00
-0.01 -0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.13 0.44 0.05 0.13
2.38
1.29
1.00
5.00
-0.16 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15 0.11 0.08 -0.14 -0.05 0.02
2.50
1.32
1.00
5.00
-0.01 -0.10 0.02 -0.22 -0.14 0.09 -0.18 -0.03 0.01
2.12
1.22
1.00
5.00
-0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.11 0.09 0.03 0.03
1.42
0.91
1.00
5.00
-0.05 0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.05 -0.18 -0.18
1.58
0.98
1.00
5.00
-0.05 -0.12 0.17 0.00 -0.14 0.05 -0.14 0.08 0.07
1.73
1.22
1.00
5.00
-0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.16 -0.01 0.08 -0.19 -0.25 -0.19
2.36
1.42
1.00
5.00
-0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.14 -0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.19
2.90
1.10
1.00
5.00
-0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.19 -0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.17 0.21
2.35
0.94
1.00
5.00
0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12
1.92
1.29
1.00
5.00
-0.12 -0.11 0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.20 -0.13 -0.23 -0.05
0.40
0.49
0.00
1.00
0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.06 -0.16 -0.11 0.19 0.06 0.02
1483 2700
1.00
7445
-0.43 -0.55 -0.04 0.02 -0.21 0.28 -0.03 0.14 0.08
3.43
1.63
0.00
6.00
0.55 -0.19 0.12 0.06 -0.79 -0.07 -0.16 0.09 0.12
3.39
1.82
0.00
6.00
-0.66 -0.79 -0.02 -0.05 -0.20 0.19 -0.15 0.06 0.04

To calculate the interaction variable, we mean-centered the variables measuring target labor rights and acquirer M&A experience.
This variable is not directly included in our model. We included it in the correlation table for informative purpose.
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Table 3 (Cont'd)
Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 253)
Variables
1. Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights
2. Target country labor rights1
3. Target country labor rights x acquirer M&A experience1
4. Acquirer M&A Experience1
5. Acquirer country labor rights
6. Target country labor rights x difference in acquirer target shareholder rights
7. Cross-border acquisition
8. Domestic industry growth
9. International domestic growth
10. Acquisition motive: Access to new products
11. Acquisition motive: New market entry
12. Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies
13. Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources
14. Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources
15. Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity
16. Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk
17. Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm
18. Acquisition motive: Block a rival
19. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger target profitability
20. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger acquirer profitability
21. Relative annual sales of target to acquirer
22. Public acquirer
23. Predicted # of M&As in target country
24. Acquirer country shareholder rights2
25. Target country shareholder rights2
1
2

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

-0.21
0.06
0.29
-0.02
-0.06
0.18
0.10
-0.20
-0.03
0.18
0.10
-0.06
-0.08
0.08
0.09

-0.05
-0.11
0.09
-0.02
0.09
-0.04
0.10
0.10
0.01
-0.02
0.10
0.09
0.01
0.02

0.16
0.04
0.29
0.12
0.02
0.20
0.07
-0.12
0.37
-0.12
0.03
-0.07
0.13

0.18
-0.05
0.12
0.09
0.11
0.09
0.02
0.08
-0.08
0.11
0.12
0.12

0.08
0.14
0.10
0.08
0.08
0.01
-0.04
0.06
0.07
0.02
0.03

0.12
0.19
0.29
0.13
0.07
0.20
0.02
-0.03
-0.09
-0.03

0.21
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.12
-0.04
0.11
0.12
0.17

0.13
-0.41
-0.05
0.06
-0.04
-0.11
-0.01
0.02

-0.15
-0.01
-0.05
0.02
0.01
-0.14
0.00

-0.05
0.07
-0.06
-0.03
0.06
0.08

-0.14
0.04
-0.11
-0.02
-0.07

To calculate the interaction variable, we mean-centered the variables measuring target labor rights and acquirer M&A experience.
This variable is not directly included in our model. We included it in the correlation table for informative purpose.

43

21

22

23

24

-0.03
0.17 0.14
0.02 0.12 0.22
0.16 0.06 0.67 0.27

Table 4
OLS Regressions Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization

Variables
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights

Target country labor rights

Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience

Acquirer M&A Experience
Acquirer country labor rights
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights
Cross-border acquisition
Domestic industry growth
International industry growth
Acquisition motive: Access to new products
Acquisition motive: New market entry
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm
Acquisition motive: Block a rival
Pre-merger target profitability
Pre-merger acquirer profitability
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer
Public acquirer
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2
Constant
R2
n
1

Post-Acquisition Target Firm Restructuring1:
R&D
Manufacturing
Model 1
Model 2
0.41*
0.10*
(0.26)
(0.07)
0.19*
0.18*
-0.54***
-0.38***
(0.22)
(0.15)
-0.41***
-0.40***
0.09*
0.03***
(0.06)
(0.01)
0.15*
0.42***
0.00
0.02***
(0.04)
(0.01)
0.05
-0.04
(0.17)
(0.13)
1.14˜
0.01
(0.78)
(0.51)
0.41
0.66***
(0.46)
(0.28)
-0.10
-0.18
(0.24)
(0.15)
-0.09
-0.19
(0.24)
(0.15)
0.03
-0.15**
(0.12)
(0.08)
-0.25***
-0.39***
(0.12)
(0.08)
0.03
-0.06
(0.11)
(0.09)
-0.13
0.07
(0.12)
(0.07)
0.14
-0.03
(0.14)
(0.09)
-0.01
-0.08
(0.26)
(0.15)
-0.18
-0.04
(0.18)
(0.11)
0.22*
0.23***
(0.16)
(0.10)
0.41***
0.30***
(0.13)
(0.08)
-0.07
-0.07
(0.11)
(0.09)
0.37*
0.29***
(0.24)
(0.15)
0.14
0.09
(0.15)
(0.08)
0.20
-0.32*
(0.34)
(0.21)
-1.49**
(0.08)
2.81
(1.27)

0.16
(0.46)
3.52
(0.71)

-0.11
(0.01)
3.77
(1.02)

21.60%
253

41.3%
253

30.3%
253

Standard errors of regression coefficients are shown in parentheses.
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized regression coefficients are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
2
The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2. The regression coefficient and its standard error
for this variable has been multiplied by 10000.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .10; one-tailed tests.
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Sales Networks
Model 3
0.40***
(0.22)
0.21***
-0.56***
(0.17)
-0.49***
0.11***
(0.05)
0.26***
0.01
(0.03)
0.16
(0.14)
-0.59
(0.65)
-0.16
(0.37)
-0.01
(0.19)
-0.15
(0.19)
-0.11
(0.11)
-.25***
(0.10)
0.20
(0.17)
-0.12
(0.14)
0.30***
(0.11)
0.17
(0.20)
-0.25*
(0.15)
-0.17
(0.16)
0.11
(0.13)
-0.17*
(0.12)
0.40***
(0.19)
-0.04
(0.11)
-0.41*
(0.29)

Table 4 (Cont'd)
OLS Regressions Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization

Variables
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights

Target country labor rights

Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience

Acquirer M&A Experience
Acquirer country labor rights
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights
Cross-border acquisition
Domestic industry growth
International industry growth
Acquisition motive: Access to new products
Acquisition motive: New market entry
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm
Acquisition motive: Block a rival
Pre-merger target profitability
Pre-merger acquirer profitability
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer
Public acquirer
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2
Constant
R2
n
1

Post-Acquisition Transfer of Acquirer Resources to Target1:
Technology
Marketing
Management
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
0.04
0.13
-0.02
(0.14)
(0.17)
(0.18)
0.03
0.08
-0.01
-0.20***
-0.29***
-0.33***
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.14)
-0.26***
-0.30***
-0.31***
0.01*
0.01*
0.02***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.14*
0.23***
0.14*
0.01
0.02*
0.05***
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.08
0.12
0.13
(0.09)
(0.11)
(0.12)
0.23
-0.46
-0.32
(0.41)
(0.48)
(0.53)
-0.27
-0.20
-0.47*
(0.22)
(0.25)
(0.28)
0.02
0.19*
0.17
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.15)
-0.13
-0.12
-0.18
(0.12)
(0.14)
(0.15)
0.06
0.13**
0.06
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
-0.02
-0.04
0.07
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
-0.01
0.06
-0.12
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
-0.03
-0.03
0.02
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.09)
0.09
0.12*
0.03
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.09)
0.20***
0.13
0.13
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.13)
-0.04
0.04
-0.15*
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.12)
-0.06
-0.01
-.17**
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.09)
0.10*
0.06
0.05
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
-0.17***
-0.12**
-0.28***
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.10)
-0.05
0.10
0.01
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.11)
0.09
0.14*
0.12*
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.09)
0.37***
0.18
0.33*
(0.17)
(0.19)
(0.22)
-0.21
(0.43)
1.01
(0.65)

-0.74*
(0.51)
0.73
(0.76)

-1.08***
(0.57)
1.55
(0.84)

16.3%
253

16.4%
253

16.9%
253

Standard errors of regression coefficients are shown in parentheses beneath unstandardized regression coefficients.
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized regression coefficients are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
2
The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2. The regression coefficient and its standard error
for this variable has been multiplied by 10000.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .10; one-tailed tests.
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Table 4 (Cont'd)
OLS Regressions Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization

Variables
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights

Target country labor rights

Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience

Acquirer M&A Experience
Acquirer country labor rights
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights
Cross-border acquisition
Domestic industry growth
International industry growth
Acquisition motive: Access to new products
Acquisition motive: New market entry
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm
Acquisition motive: Block a rival
Pre-merger target profitability
Pre-merger acquirer profitability
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer
Public acquirer
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2
Constant
R2
n
1

Post-Acquisition Transfer of Target Resources to Acquirer 1:
Technology
Marketing
Management
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
0.17***
0.27***
0.11***
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.06)
0.27***
0.39***
0.22***
-0.23*
-0.35***
-0.19***
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.10)
-0.23*
-0.31***
-0.26***
-0.29
-0.68
0.00
(0.52)
(0.60)
(0.00)
-0.05
-0.11
0.00
0.20
-0.09
0.00
(0.25)
(0.29)
(0.00)
0.20*
0.39***
0.15*
(0.14)
(0.15)
(0.10)
-0.13
0.79*
0.25
(0.52)
(0.58)
(0.35)
-0.06
0.27
0.01
(0.27)
(0.32)
(0.18)
0.07
-0.28**
0.19***
(0.14)
(0.17)
(0.10)
0.13
0.36***
-0.03
(0.15)
(0.17)
(0.10)
0.13**
0.34***
0.03
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.05)
-0.02
-0.02
0.07*
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.05)
0.03
0.35***
0.10*
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.06)
0.08
-0.10
0.11***
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.06)
0.04
0.12
0.03
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.06)
0.21**
0.34**
0.13**
(0.13)
(0.18)
(0.08)
0.08
-0.21*
0.09
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.07)
0.03
0.15*
-0.01
(0.09)
(0.11)
(0.06)
0.06
-0.03
0.02
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.05)
0.01
-0.01
0.10*
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.06)
0.02
-0.05
-0.05
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.10)
0.18***
0.02
0.18***
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.06)
-0.16
-0.03
-0.03
(0.21)
(0.25)
(0.14)
0.04
(0.05)
1.02
(0.68)

0.01
(0.05)
0.75
(0.77)

-0.06
(0.01)
0.55
(0.48)

17.7%
253

39.4%
253

29.1%
253

Standard errors of regression coefficients are shown in parentheses beneath unstandardized regression coefficients.
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized regression coefficients are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
2
The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2. The regression coefficient and its standard error
for this variable has been multiplied by 10000.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .10; one-tailed tests.
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Table 5
1

AMOS Structural Equation Models Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization
Variables
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights

Target country labor rights

Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience

Acquirer M&A Experience
Acquirer country labor rights
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights
Cross-border acquisition
Domestic industry growth
International industry growth
Acquisition motive: Access to new products
Acquisition motive: New market entry
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm
Acquisition motive: Block a rival
Pre-merger target profitability
Pre-merger acquirer profitability
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer
Public acquirer
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2
2

R
Chi-Square (degree of freedom)
n
1

Target Restructuring
Model 10

Resource Transfer to Target
Model 11

Resource Transfer to Acquirer
Model 12

0.19***
0.11
0.32***
-0.17***
0.07
-0.17***
-0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.01
0.00
0.09**
0.08
0.01
0.40
0.07
0.19
0.01
0.09
-0.01
0.10
-0.05
0.06
-0.42***
0.06
0.02
0.07
-0.16***
0.07
0.16**
0.07
0.03
0.10
-0.08
0.09
-0.01
0.07
0.22***
0.06
-0.21***
0.07
0.17**
0.12
0.05
0.07
-0.04
0.18

0.08*3
0.10
0.14*
-0.30***
0.06
-0.30***
0.27***
0.01
0.02***
0.31***
0.00
0.14**
0.07
-0.01
0.36
-0.12*
0.17
-0.08
0.08
0.04
0.09
0.11*
0.06
-0.03
0.05
-0.01
0.06
-0.05
0.06
0.09
0.07**
0.12**
0.09
-0.04
0.08
-0.02
0.07
0.08
0.06
-0.02
0.07
0.10*
0.11
0.12*
0.06
0.08
0.16

0.27***
0.10
0.46***
-0.15***
0.06
-0.16***
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.12*
0.00
0.21***
0.07
0.11*
0.37
0.13**
0.18
0.02
0.09
-0.11*
0.09
0.42***
0.06
-0.03
0.05
0.18***
0.06
-0.09**
0.06
0.13**
0.07
0.11*
0.09
-0.02
0.09
0.12*
0.07
0.05
0.06
-0.08
0.07
0.05
0.11
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.17

0.04
0.00

-0.15***
0.00

0.06
0.00

44%
1378 (300)
253

41%
1383(300)
253

48%
1396(300)
253

Standard errors of estimates are shown in parentheses beneath unstandardized regression coefficients.
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized estimates are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .10; two-tailed tests.

2

3

Significant at one-tailed test.

47

Appendix 1: Calculation of Summary Indicators of the EPL Strictness Index
EPL summary indicators at four successive levels of aggregation
Level 4
Scale 0-6

Level 3
Scale 0-6

Regular contracts
(version 2: 5/12)
(version 1: ½)

Overall
summary
indicator

Level 2
Scale 0-6
Procedural
inconveniences (1/3)

Notice and severance pay
for no-fault individual
dismissals (1/3)

Difficulty of dismissal
(1/3)

Temporary contracts
(version 2: 5/12)
(version 1: ½)

Fixed-term contracts
(1/2)
Temporary work
agency (TWA)
employment (1/2)

Collective
dismissals
(version 2: 2/12)
(version 1:0)

level 1
Scale 0-6
1. Notification procedures
2. Delay to start a notice
3. Notice period after

9 months
4 years
20 years
4. Severance pay after
9 months
4 years
20 years
5. Definition of unfair dismissal
6. Trial period
7. Compensation
8. Reinstatement
9. Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts
10. Maximum number of successive contracts
11. Maximum cumulated duration
12. TWA work is illegal
13. Restrictions on number of renewals
14. Maximum cumulated duration
15. Definition of collective dismissal
16. Additional notification requirements
17. Additional delays involved
18. Other special costs to employers

(1/2)
(1/2)
(1/7)
(1/7)
(1/7)
(4/21)
(4/21)
(4/21)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/2)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/2)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1/4)

The first step of the procedure was to score all of these first-level measures of EPL in comparable units. They were
converted into cardinal scores that were normalized to range from 0 to 6, with higher scores representing stricter
regulation (see Table 2.A1.1). The three remaining steps consisted of forming successive weighted averages,
constructing three sets of summary indicators that correspond to successively more aggregated measures of EPL
strictness (see Table 2.A1.2). The last step of the procedure involved computing, for each country, an overall
summary indicator based on the three subcomponents: strictness of regulation for regular contracts, temporary
contracts and collective dismissals. The summary measure for collective dismissals was attributed just 40% of the
weight assigned to regular and temporary contracts. The rationale for this is that the collective dismissals indicator
only reflects additional employment protection triggered by the collective nature of the dismissal. In most countries,
these additional requirements are quite modest. Moreover, summary measures for collective dismissals have only
been available since the late 1990s. An alternative overall index, so-called version 1, has been thus calculated as an
unweighted average of the summary measures for regular and temporary contracts only. While more restrictive than
the previous index (so-called version 2), this alternative measure of overall EPL strictness allows comparisons over
a longer period of time.
In our paper, we used version 1 of the EPL strictness index because we had operations that dated back to
the early 1990s. We also used version 2 of the index in sensitivity analyses, and our results remained similar.
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Appendix 2: Survey Items

CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF R&D
Please give a ROUGH ASSESSMENT of the proportion of the physical R&D facilities closed or resold, the proportion
of the R&D personnel affected by the restructuring of R&D facilities, and the proportion of the R&D personnel
cut as a result of the merger.
Acquired business
% of physical R&D facilities closed or resold (as a
proportion of total physical R&D facilities)
% of R&D personnel affected by the restructuring of
R&D facilities (as a proportion of total R&D personnel)
% of R&D personnel cut (as a proportion of total R&D
personnel)

0%

1-10% 11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

71-90% 91-100%

0%

1-10% 11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

71-90% 91-100%

0%

1-10% 11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

71-90% 91-100%

CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF MANUFACTURING
Please give a ROUGH ASSESSMENT of the proportion of the physical manufacturing facilities closed or resold, the
proportion of the production capacity restructured, and the proportion of the manufacturing workforce cut as a
result of the merger.
Acquired business
% of physical manufacturing facilities closed or resold (as
a proportion of total physical manufacturing facilities)

0%

1-10%

11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

71-90%

91-100%

% production capacity restructured (as a proportion of total
production capacity)

0%

1-10%

11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

71-90%

91-100%

% of manufacturing workforce cut (as a proportion of total
manufacturing workforce)

0%

1-10%

11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

71-90%

91-100%

CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF SALES NETWORKS
Please give a ROUGH ASSESSMENT of the proportion of the sales networks closed or resold, the proportion of the
sales affected by the restructuring of sales networks, and the proportion of the sales personnel cut as a result of
the merger.

Acquired business
% of sales networks closed or resold (as a proportion of

0%

1-10%

11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

7190%

91-100%

% sales affected by the restructuring of sales
networks (as a proportion of total sales)

0%

1-10%

11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

7190%

91-100%

% of sales personnel cut (as a proportion of total sales

0%

1-10%

11-30%

31-50%

51-70%

7190%

91-100%

total sales networks)

personnel)
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TRANSFER OF RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE, AND CAPABILITIES
To what extent have the acquired business’s staff and your existing business’s staff been transferred or rotated across
the two firms?
Transfer of staff
From the acquired business to your business
From your business to the acquired business
NOT AT
TO SOME
TO A VERY
NOT AT
TO SOME
TO A VERY
ALL

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Senior executives .....................
Engineers, technicians .............
Researchers..............................
Manufacturing workers............
Sales personnel ........................
Administrative staff .................

1
1
1
1
1
1

EXTENT

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

LARGE EXTENT

4
4
4
4
4
4

ALL

5
5
5
5
5
5

1
1
1
1
1
1

EXTENT

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

LARGE EXTENT

4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5

Control questions
At the time of the acquisition, what was the growth of the market for the line of business of the
acquired firm? (Please answer with respect to both your domestic and international markets).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The domestic market (your country)
A RAPIDLY GROWING MARKET
A SLOWLY GROWING MARKET
A STABLE MARKET
A SLOWLY DECLINING MARKET
A RAPIDLY DECLINING MARKET
NOT APPROPRIATE, (please specify):

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The international market
A RAPIDLY GROWING MARKET
A SLOWLY GROWING MARKET
A STABLE MARKET
A SLOWLY DECLINING MARKET
A RAPIDLY DECLINING MARKET
NOT APPROPRIATE, (please specify):

Please use the scale below to assess the importance of the following motives in acquiring the
target business (from one to five, one being not important at all, five being very important).
NOT IMPORTANT
AT ALL

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

To enter a new geographical market.............................................................
To achieve economies of scale in manufacturing .........................................
To achieve economies of scale in R&D, sales promotion,
distribution or administration .......................................................................
To acquire assets (tangible and/or intangible) or capabilities
to be used in your existing business .............................................................
To transfer assets (tangible and/or intangible) or
capabilities to assist the acquired business ...................................................
To reduce overcapacity in the industry.........................................................
To diversify your financial risk ....................................................................
To turn around a failing firm ........................................................................
To prevent a competitor from acquiring the target business.........................
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VERY
IMPORTANT

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

Relative proportion of the acquired business’s annual sales in comparison to your firm’s sales
before the acquisition (in the line of business concerned):
1.

< 25%

2. 25-49%

3.

50-74%

Profitability (Profit/capital employed) of the
acquired business relative to industry average before the
acquisition:
1. MUCH MORE PROFITABLE
2. MORE PROFITABLE
3. EQUIVALENT
4. LESS PROFITABLE
5. MUCH LESS PROFITABLE

4.

75-100%
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>100%

Profitability (Profit/capital employed) of your
existing business relative to industry average before the
acquisition:
1. MUCH MORE PROFITABLE
2. MORE PROFITABLE
3. EQUIVALENT
4. LESS PROFITABLE
5. MUCH LESS PROFITABLE

Number of business(es) or firm(s) acquired by your firm within the last five years:
............................... ACQUIRED FIRMS

5.

